Consider an abstract social choice setting with incomplete information, where the number of alternatives is large. Albeit natural, implementing VCG mechanisms is infeasible due to the prohibitive communication constraints. However, if players restrict attention to a subset of the alternatives, feasibility may be recovered.
are arbitrary, the unique ex-post equilibrium is that of weakly dominant strategies. However, by imposing one restriction on the valuation space, we can recover the positive result and provide a large set of ex-post equilibria. The restriction we consider is that for each player there is a single social alternative such that any valuation function in the valuation space is maximized at this alternative (in other words, each player has a type-independent optimal social alternative). In terms of efficiency loss, we show that in the general case the efficiency loss grows with the number of players, and cannot be bounded uniformly. In fact, we show that the efficiency loss is on the order of magnitude of the number of players and this cannot be improved upon. However, we propose two types of restrictions on the set of valuations that induce a uniform bound on the efficiency loss.
A related strand of the literature is on ex-post implementation, which is part of the mechanism design literature. The research goal of most papers on ex-post implementation is to characterize the conditions needed for obtaining a mechanism that implements some social choice functions under the ex-post equilibrium solution. Some recent contributions to this literature are Bergemann and Morris [2008] , Bikhchandani [2006] and Jehiel et al. [2006] . Given the research goal of this literature, these papers do not yield mechanisms that have low complexity. Nisan and Segal [2006] study the trade-off between communication complexity and efficiency in allocation problems.
In Section 2 we provide the basic model and definitions. Section 3 discusses the existence and structure of ex-post equilibria, whereas Section 4 analyzes their efficiency. Section 5 is devoted to a comparison of our results with those of and , who study the combinatorial auction setting. The proofs are relegated to the appendix.
MODEL
Let A be a finite abstract set of social alternatives and let N be a finite set of n = |N| agents. A valuation function for agent i is a function v i : A → IR and v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) ∈ (IR A ) n denotes a vector of valuations, one for each agent.
An allocation mechanism, M : (IR A ) n → A, chooses a single alternative for each vector of valuations. We say that M is a social welfare maximizer if M(v) ∈ arg max a∈A i v i (a) for all v ∈ (IR A ) n . Let M N be the set of all social welfare maximizers for the set of agents N. Note that two elements in M N differ only in the way they break ties.
A set of agents, N, a social welfare maximizing mechanism, M, a set of functions h i : (IR A ) N−{i} → IR, ∀i ∈ N, and a set of valuations, V i ⊂ IR A , for each i, defines a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) game, denoted (N, M, h, V) , where h = (h i ) n i=1 and V = i∈N V i .
-Agent i's strategy, b i : V i → IR A , maps his true valuation to an announced one (possibly not in V i ); b i (v)(a) is the valuation announced for alternative a, when the actual valuation is v and the strategy is b i . Let b = (b 1 , . . . , b n ) denote the agents' strategy profile and let b i (V i ) ⊂ IR A be the set of all possible announcements of i. -For any v ∈ V and any strategy profile, b, the utility of agent i is U i = v i (M(b(v) 
That is each agent derives utility from the social alternative chosen and additionally enjoys a monetary transfer composed of a positive transfer equal to the sum of the others' valuations and a negative transfer that is independent of his announcement.
We refer to the set of all VCG games where h i = 0 as VC games. We note the following two observations about such VCG games.
-The bid b i is a best response for agent i, against b −i , in some VCG games if and only if it is a best response in all VCG games. -The truth-telling strategy, b i (v i ) = v i , weakly dominates any other strategy in any VCG game. Furthermore, it is the unique strategy with that property (up to a constant).
Given these comments it seems that there is no need for any additional game theoretic analysis of VCG games. However, recently there has been a growing interest in the literature on situations where agents face a large number of social alternatives, in which case the communication of an agent's valuation is prohibitively long, and practical reasons render the truth-telling strategy as impossible. One example of such a situation is a combinatorial auction, where the number of social alternatives is exponential in the number of goods. Another example is an assignment problem, where "jobs" are assigned to "resources" (e.g., positions to people). In this case the number of rankings grows quickly with the number of jobs and resources.
The communication complexity issue, discussed in the preceding, motivates an alternative analysis of the solution concepts for large VCG games. We follow on two recent papers, and . We look for natural solution concepts that are less demanding in terms of the agents' communication needs, yet are almost as convincing, in terms of the incentive compatibility requirements, as weakly dominant strategies (truth telling).
Ex-Post Equilibrium
The solution concept of dominant strategies has the following appealing properties.
-Agents act optimally no matter what other agents do.
-The solution concept makes no use of any probabilistic information on agents' valuations, either by the agents themselves or by the mechanism designer. -Agents' strategies are robust to changes in the number of players.
In addition, the solution is attained with truth-telling strategies that are quite simple (knowing v i , agent i does not need to do any computation). Consequently we deduce that the chosen alternative is the socially efficient one. We also note that by choosing functions h i properly, the game is individually rational. An alternative, yet weaker, solution concept is that of an ex-post equilibrium.
Definition 2.1. A tuple of strategies, b, is an ex-post equilibrium, for the VCG game, (N, M, h, V) , if for any player i ∈ N, any valuation v i ∈ V i , and any alternative strategyb i of i,
Definition 2.2. Fix a set of agents, N, a set of social alternatives A, and a set of valuations, one for each agent, V ⊂ (IR A ) n . A tuple of strategies, b, is an ex-post equilibrium for the class of VCG games, over (N, A, V) , if for all N ⊂ N, (b j ) j∈N is an ex-post equilibrium for (N , M, h, V), for all M ∈ M N and h ∈ H.
Note that an ex-post equilibrium for the class of VCG games has many of the properties of the solution concept of dominant strategies. 1 -Agents act optimally no matter what other agents' valuations are, as long as they all keep to their strategies. In other words, agents have no incentive to unilaterally deviate, even after all valuations have been realized. 2 -The solution concept makes no use of any probabilistic information on agents' valuations. -Agents' strategies are robust to changes in the number of players.
Example 2.3. Consider a standard Vickrey auction of 2 goods, A and B, with 2 bidders. There are 9 possible allocations of the goods (one can choose to allocate goods to none of the agents). Let V i be the set of agent i's valuations that depend only on the goods allocated to i and are monotonically nondecreasing. Consider the following strategies: Agent 1 announces the true valuation of the grand bundle (composed of both goods); and the bundle composed only of good A; however she announces zero for the bundle composed only of good B. Agent 2 announces his true valuation for the grand bundle and for good B and zero for A. These 2 strategies form an ex-post equilibrium of the standard Vickrey auction. In fact, they form an ex-post equilibrium for the class of VCG games, over V. 3 Example 2.4. Consider an auction of M goods and N agents. As before, let V i be the set of i's valuations that depend only on the goods allocated to i and are monotonically nondecreasing. Let b i be the strategy that assigns the true value to the grand coalition and zero to all other allocations. show that this is an ex-post equilibrium, for the class of VCG games, over V.
2.1.1. The Revelation Principle. The presentation of our model would not be complete without referring to the celebrated revelation principle (see, e.g., Myerson [1979] ) and its role in the current model. The revelation principle argues that any given (ex-post) equilibrium of an arbitrary mechanism can be replicated as a truthful (ex-post) equilibrium of a direct mechanism. The argument underlying this principle is the existence of a transformation of the original mechanism to another mechanism for which the original equilibrium maps into a truthful equilibrium (this is the well-known "simulation" argument). However, if the original mechanism possessed other equilibria then there is no guarantee that such a transformation would map them into equilibria of the new mechanism. Thus, when one is interested in an analysis of the set of all ex-post equilibria of a given mechanism, as we do here, then the revelation principle may be an inadequate tool. 4 An orthogonal argument for ignoring the revelation principle in our setting is related to the motivation of the model, which is communication complexity. As argued by , the original mechanism and the mechanism derived from PROPOSITION 3.1. Assume b is an ex-post equilibrium for the class of VCG games, over (N,A,V) . If V i ⊂ V i then b is an ex-post equilibrium for the class of VCG games, over (N,A,V ) .
PROOF. Follows directly from the definition.
Unfortunately, if the set of valuation functions is large enough then there are no ex-post equilibria other than (near) truth telling for any large class of VCG games. THEOREM 3.2. Assume that n ≥ 2 and |A| > 2, or alternatively that n ≥ 3. Then a strategy profile b is an ex-post equilibrium for the class of VCG mechanisms over
In particular, note that the valuations reported by the agents may differ from the true valuations; however, the difference between the true valuation and the reported ones must be constant. We shall refer to such strategies as nearly truth telling over A (see Definition 3.4 following).
The proof of Theorem 3.2 is composed of two distinct proofs, one for the case n ≥ 2 and |A| > 2 and a different one for the case n ≥ 3.
One can hope that by adding more structure to the problem, the positive result can be salvaged. A valuation function is called non-negative if v i (a) ≥ 0 for all a ∈ A. Let IR A + be the set of all non-negative valuation functions. Indeed this is a natural property in the case of combinatorial auctions. Nevertheless, the following theorem applies. THEOREM 3.3. Assume that n ≥ 2 and |A| > 2, or alternatively that n ≥ 3. Then a strategy profile b is an ex-post equilibrium for the class of VCG games over (N,
It is relatively straightforward to show that the specific strategies prescribed in Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 form an ex-post equilibrium. The difficulty of the proof lies in the second direction.
Constant Maximum Valuations
We say that a set of valuations V i has a maximum if there exists some a ∈ A, called the maximum, such that v i (a) ≥ v i (a ) for all a ∈ A and all v i ∈ V i . Note that the set of nondecreasing valuations, in the combinatorial auction setting, has a maximum. In particular, any allocation that gives all the goods to agent i is a maximum.
Valuation sets that have a maximum prevail in other settings as well. In the context of ordering a set of tasks, consider the valuations with the property that any agent wants her own task to be processed first, but otherwise cares about which other tasks precede her own task. In the context of network construction, consider valuations where each player (who is a vertex in a graph) always prefers the star-shaped graph centered around him over any other graph. Finally, in the context of facility location, assume an agent always prefers all the "good" facilities (e.g., library) to neighbor her and all the "bad" facilities (e.g., waste disposal) to be as far away as possible.
Let R i (a i ) be the set of all non-negative valuation functions for which a i is a maximum, and let R( a) = × n i=1 R i (a i ). The following family of strategies will play an important role in this family of valuations.
Definition 3.4. Let A ⊂ A be a subset of social alternatives. A strategy profile is called nearly truth telling over A :
A nearly truth-telling strategy prescribes telling the truth, up to a shift in a constant, on some subset of preselected alternatives, and assigns a valuation of C to all other alternatives. So players using this strategy need only communicate |A | + 1 numbers, instead of |A| numbers. THEOREM 3.5. Consider the class of VCG games over (N, A, R( a)), where a = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ), and let A ⊂ A satisfy a i ∈ A ∀a i , i = 1, . . . , , n (all the n maxima are in A ). Then any nearly truth-telling strategy profile over A is an ex-post equilibrium for this class.
Unfortunately, not all ex-post equilibria are nearly truth-telling for some subset A . Consider the following strategy profile: b i (v i )(a k ) = v i (a k ) + 10 for all maxima, a k , k = 1, . . . , n, and for all a ∈ {a k : k = 1, . . . , n}, b i (v i )(a) is chosen arbitrarily in the interval [ 0, 9] . We leave it to the reader to verify that b is an ex-post equilibrium for the class of VCG games over (N, A, R(a)).
Although we are not able to characterize all ex-post equilibria for the class of VCG games over (N, A, R(a)), we can provide some necessary conditions. THEOREM 3.6. If n ≥ 3 and the strategy profile, b, is an ex-post equilibrium for the class of VCG games over (N, A, R(a)),
, for all i and k, where a k is the maximum for player k.
In other words, in any ex-post equilibrium players (almost) report their true valuations on the set of maxima.
EFFICIENCY
It is quite obvious that even if ex-post equilibria exist, as in the models discussed in Theorems 4.2 and 4.4, the demand on communication may be much smaller, compared with the dominant strategy solution. In fact, agents may need as little as reporting the value for N alternatives only (compare N = 50 with 2 50 or 50 50 alternatives in example 1.1).
In Section 2.1 we provided arguments "why", conceptually, the notion of ex-post equilibrium is almost as robust as the dominant strategy solution. However, when it comes to efficiency and social welfare the two solution concepts differ. Whereas, the dominant strategy solution maximizes social welfare (the sum of agents' utilities) this is not the case for many ex-post equilibria.
Example 4.1. Consider a complete information combinatorial auction setting with N agents and N goods, both indexed by i. Assume agent i values the bundle of goods, K, as follows:
Consider a strategy profile where each agent bids zero over any bundle that is not the grand bundle and truthfully on the grand bundle. This is an ex-post equilibrium of the complete information combinatorial auction and the communication complexity is very low. 6 However this results in assigning the grand bundle randomly to one of the players, achieving a social welfare of 1 + , as opposed to the maximal social welfare of N that is achievable in the dominant strategy solution. Thus, the efficiency ratio is N.
denote the social welfare for the social alternative a. Let r(a, a ) = S(a) S(a ) . For any VCG mechanism and any strategy profile d, we denote by VCG(d(v) ) the resulting social alternative, at the valuation profile v. Recall that the dominant strategy profile b maximizes S, namely S(VCG(b(v))) ≥ S(a) ∀a. The following theorem extends a result of . THEOREM 4.2. Consider the class of VCG games over (N, A, R( a)), where a = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ), and let A ⊂ A satisfy a i ∈ A ∀a i , i = 1, . . . , , n (all the n maxima are in A ). Let d be a nearly truth-telling strategy profile over A that is an expost equilibrium for this class and let b be the dominant strategy equilibrium. Then
PROOF. The proof is similar to that of Remark 1 in :
where a i is the alternative i prefers. On the other hand, a i is one of the alternatives for which valuations are announced, therefore
which completes the proof.
Example 4.1 shows that this bound is tight. In fact, we can use the principles of that example to show that the efficiency loss is not gradual and that one can get a high efficiency loss even when the communication complexity is very high.
Example 4.3. Consider a setting with N players and M social alternatives. Let a i denote the optimal social alternative for i and let a 0 ∈ {a 1 , . . . , a N } denote an arbitrary alternative. Assume players play an ex-post equilibrium with near truthtelling strategies on M − {a 0 }. Now consider the following valuation for player i: v i (a i ) = 1 + i ,v i (a 0 ) = 1 and v i (a) = 0 for all other alternatives. For this vector of valuations, the resulting alternative is a N and the social welfare is 1 + N , whereas in the dominant strategy equilibrium the resulting alternative is a 0 with a social welfare of N. r (VCG(b(v) ), VCG(d(v) )) approaches N as approaches zero.
The bound we have shown is not a satisfactory one, as the number of players may be quite large. We consider two families of valuations for which the efficiency loss is independent of the number of players.
The family of valuations
. In other words, for each alternative there cannot be a great difference of opinion. 7 In many settings valuations are bounded, say
In such settings, if α > 0 then valuations are homogeneous of degree p = β α . Another example for valuations of degree p is in correlated settings where a common strictly positive signal is drawn and agents' valuations are generated via idiosyncratic adjustments of the common signal. More concretely think of a set of firms that compete for some public resource. The quality of the resource, and hence the potential revenues is common, yet the production costs, as a ratio of the revenues, can be between 0 < α and β < 1. In this case homogeneity of degree p = 1−α 1−β prevails.
. . , , n (all the n maxima are in A ). Let d be a nearly truth-telling strategy profile over A that is an ex-post equilibrium for this class and let b be the dominant strategy equilibrium. Then r (VCG(b(v) 
PROOF. Let i 0 denote the agent that values the alternative VCG(b(v)) the most and let a i 0 be the alternative i 0 prefers.
Because a i 0 is one of the alternatives for which valuations are announced it holds that
Another family of valuations that we study is one where players' valuations differ significantly over each alternative. A family of valuations V = (V 1 , . . . , V N ) is called compatible of degree p if for any v ∈ V and any m ∈ M there are at most p players for which v i (m) > 0. As an example consider a combinatorial auction with p goods. THEOREM 4.5. Consider the class of VCG games over (N 
. . , , n (all the n maxima are in A ). Let d be an ex-post equilibrium for this class and let b be the dominant strategy equilibrium. Then r (VCG(b(v) ), VCG(d(v) )) ≤ p.
The proof of this theorem mimics the proof of Theorem 4.2, with p replacing N, and is therefore omitted. Note that in combinatorial auctions, the number of players that have a positive valuation for any alternative is at most the number of goods. Additionally, in any bundling equilibrium derived from a partition of the set of goods, the number of players that have a positive valuation for any alternative is at most the size of the partition.
COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS
An analysis of ex-post equilibria in VCG mechanisms for the setting of combinatorial auctions is provided in and . These papers focus on combinatorial auctions with 3 bidders or more with monotonic valuations. Their main finding is that the ex-post equilibria of such auctions are characterized by submitting bids on a subset of the possible bundles (this is referred to as a bundling equilibrium), which is a quasi-field. Namely, it is a non-empty set of sets that is closed under complements and under disjoint unions.
Note that a social alternative in the auction setting is an assignment of the set of all goods to the set of players (the bidders and the seller). However, a player's valuation depends only on the goods allocated to her (there are no externalities). Therefore specifying agent i's valuation for a bundle B induces valuations for all social alternatives in which agent i receives the bundle B. In addition, monotonic valuations imply that allocating the grand bundle to agent i always maximizes i's valuation over the possible social alternatives and so a set of maximizers is identified.
This unique structure allows for a full characterization of the ex-post equilibria, in contrast with our partial characterization for the general case. Comparing the results for the general case with those of the auction setting is not obvious as we now demonstrate.
Example 5.1. Consider an auction with 3 goods, {a, b, c} and 3 players with a subset of social alternatives:
The set S includes all the three maximizers,(abc, ∅, ∅), (∅, abc, ∅), and (∅, ∅, abc). Therefore, by Theorem 3.5 this set induces an ex-post equilibrium, where players bid truthfully over this set. On the other hand, players do not submit bids on a quasi-field. In fact, note that this ex-post equilibrium is not a bundling equilibrium as players do not bid on the same bundles. This seems to contradict the findings of Holzman et al. [2004] and .
Is this a real contradiction? The answer is clearly no. To settle this, note that when we cast our general model to the combinatorial auction setting we do not assume additional restrictions on valuation functions. In particular an agent's valuation may exhibit externalities and need not be monotonic. Therefore, valuations and bids over S are silent about valuations outside of S .
If, however, we adopt the two restrictions of monotonicity and no-externality, then the valuations of S extend to additional social alternatives. For example, if player 1 bids v on the social alternative (ab, ∅, ∅), then this implies a bid of v on the social alternative (ab, c, ∅) ∈ S . However, the valuation of player 2 for this social alternative cannot be deduced from her valuations over S , making the bids asymmetric. This in turn, makes Theorem 3.5 mute, as the conditions do not hold.
A. APPENDIXES-PROOFS
This appendix has three sections. The first section provides the machinery needed to prove one of the directions of Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 (the other is straightforward). The second section provides the proofs of these theorems and the final section is devoted to the proof of Theorems 3.5 and 3.6.
A.1. Towards a Proof of Theorems 3.2 and 3.3
We begin by providing a road map to this section. In Section A.1.1 we recall a property of an arbitrary pair of functions, due to Monderer and Holzman [2004] , which they refer to as the mean value exclusion property. We then associate with any pair of functions that satisfy this property, a unique set of open intervals and a binary function which we refer to as a family of parallelograms (see Proposition A.4). The section is mostly composed of lemmas that are needed for the proof of this Proposition (these lemmas and proofs could be ignored at first reading).
In Section A.1.2 we make some observations on the structure of ex-post equilibria and use these observations in Section A.1.3 to make a connection between ex-post equilibria and the notion of a family of parallelograms. We do so by defining an auxiliary family of functions that is derived from the equilibrium strategy applied to a unique class of valuation functions-the single-minded valuations. Namely, those that assign a positive value to one alternative and a zero value to all other alternatives. We show that pairs of such auxiliary functions satisfy the mean value exclusion property and hence we can apply the conclusion of Proposition A.4 and construct a compatible family of parallelograms. From this we can deduce various properties on the strategic behavior for single-minded valuations.
In Section A.1.4 we extend the conclusions from the single-minded valuations to arbitrary valuation functions.
A.1.1. The Mean Value Exclusion Property and Parallelograms.
Definition A.1 (Monderer and Holzman [2004] ). The pair of functions f 1 , f 2 :
Let I ⊂ R denote an open interval. We denote its closure byĪ, its supremum by I + = sup x∈I x and its infimum, by I − = inf x∈I x. Definition A.2. A family of parallelograms is a pair ( , G), where is a set of disjoint open intervals in R + that satisfies I ∈ =⇒ I − = 0 and a G : → {−1, +1} satisfies G(I 1 ) × G(I 2 ) = −1 whenever I + 1 = I − 2 . Definition A.3. Let h i : R + → R + , i = 1, 2, be a pair of functions. We say that a family of parallelograms, ( , G), is (h 1 , h 2 )-compatible if it satisfies the following conditions.
( Given an arbitrary pair of such functions, h 1 , h 2 , one is not guaranteed that a compatible and G exist. However if the two functions satisfy the aforementioned mean exclusion property then this is guaranteed, as we show in the next proposition. PROPOSITION A.4 (FAMILY OF PARALLELOGRAMS). Suppose that g i : R + → R + , i = 1, 2, satisfy the mean value exclusion condition, then there exists a set of disjoint open segments D and a function G : D → {−1, +1} that is (g 1 , g 2 )-compatible.
We begin by gradually constructing the set D as follows. 
Definition A.5. We say that a segment I satisfies the " + " condition if for all t ∈ I, g 1 (t) = I + , g 2 (t) = I − .
Definition A.6. We say that a segment I satisfies the " − " condition if for all t ∈ I, g 1 (t) = I − , g 2 (t) = I + .
When a family of segments will be created in the sequel, the "+" and "-" conditions will be attached to a segment with a function G, which will give a segment a +1 if it satisfies the "+" condition and a −1 if it satisfies the "-" condition.
LEMMA A.7. ∀I ∈ D 1 ∪ D 2 ∃I ∈ D such that I ⊆ I . PROOF OF LEMMA A.7. Let I ∈ D 1 ∪ D 2 . We first assume that g 1 (I − ) = I + ; and let x 0 = inf{x |g 1 (x ) = I + }, of course x 0 ≤ I − . If g 1 (x 0 ) = I + , then I ⊆ (x 0 , I + ) ∈ D 3 . Else there exists a sequence {x k } ∞ k=1 that converges to x 0 , such that ∀k > 0 g 1 (x k ) = I + , ∀x ≤ x 0 g 1 (x ) = I + . So we have I ⊆ (x 0 , I + ) ∈ D 5 . Now we assume that g 1 (I + ) = I − , and let y 0 = sup{y |g 1 (y ) = I − }; of course y 0 ≥ I + . If g 1 (y 0 ) = I − then I ⊆ (I − , y 0 ) ∈ D 4 . Else there exists a sequence {y k } ∞ k=1 that by Lemma A.8 converges to y 0 < ∞, such that ∀k > 0 g 1 (y k ) = I − , ∀y ≥ y 0 g 1 (y ) = I − . So, we have I ⊆ (I − , y 0 ) ∈ D 6 . LEMMA A.8. Let {y k } ∞ k=1 be a sequence such that ∀k ∈ N x < y k and g 1 (y k ) = x and y k → y. Then y < ∞.
PROOF OF LEMMA A.8. Assume for the sake of contradiction that y k → ∞ and choose t such that t > x. Then we shall see where g 2 (t) can be: g 2 (t) / ∈[ x, ∞), otherwise we can find a y m such that x ≤ g 2 (t) < y m , g 1 (y m ) = x ⇒ g 1 (y m ) ≤ g 2 (t) < y m , a contradiction to mean value exclusion.
then (x, g 1 (x)) ∈ D 1 and by Lemma A.7 it follows that there exists I ∈ D such that (x, g 1 (x)) ⊆ I, and hence x ∈Ī, contradicting the assumption. The same goes for x > g 1 (x). If x < g 2 (x), then let x < t < g 2 (x). We shall see where g 1 (t) can be:
, a contradiction. It follows that g 1 (t) ≤ x < t and hence (g 1 (t), t) ∈ D 2 . By Lemma A.7 ∃I ∈ D such that (g 1 (t), t) ⊆ I and therefore x ∈ I, contradicting the assumption. If g 2 (x) < x then let g 2 (x) < t < x. We shall see where g 1 (t) can be:
x, a contradiction. It follows that t < x ≤ g 1 (t) and hence (t, g 1 (t)) ∈ D 1 . By Lemma A.7 ∃I ∈ D such that (t, g 1 (t)) ⊆ I and therefore x ∈ I, contradicting the assumption.
LEMMA A.10. Let I ∈ D. Then I satisfies the "+" condition or the "-" condition. If I satisfies the "+" condition, then g 2 (I − ) = I − and g 1 (I + ) = I + . If I satisfies the "-" condition, then g 1 (I − ) = I − and g 2 (I + ) = I + .
PROOF OF LEMMA A.10. Let I ∈ D. We will split the proof into two parts: Part 1: if I ∈ D 3 ∪ D 5 then I satisfies the "+" condition and g 2 (I − ) = I − , g 1 (I + ) = I + . Part 2: if I ∈ D 4 ∪ D 6 then I satisfies the "-" condition and g 1 (I − ) = I − , g 2 (I + ) = I + . PROOF OF PART 1.
(1) ∀t, I − ≤ t < I + , we have g 2 (t) ≤ I − : Suppose this is not true. If I ∈ D 3 , then g 1 (I − ) = I + , so if I − < g 2 (t) ≤ g 1 (I − ) it will be a contradiction. If t < g 1 (I − ) < g 2 (t), it will also be a contradiction. If I ∈ D 5 and I − < g 2 (t) ≤ I + , then we shall look at x k of the sequence (that is given with an I ∈ D 5 ) such that I − < x k < g 2 (t) and g 1 (x k ) = I + . Then x k < g 2 (t) ≤ g 1 (x k ), a contradiction. If t < I + < g 2 (t), then again we shall look at the same x k and we will get that t < g 1 (x k ) < g 2 (t), a contradiction.
(2) ∀t, I − ≤ t < I + , we have g 2 (t) = I − : Indeed, suppose there exists I − ≤ t < I + such that g 2 (t) < I − . Choose s such that g 2 (t) < s < I − ≤ t. We shall see where g 1 (s) can be:
a contradiction. If I + < g 2 (t ) ≤ g 1 (s), we have that s < g 2 (t ) ≤ g 1 (s), a contradiction.
If g 1 (s) < g 2 (t ), we have that t < g 1 (s) < g 2 (t ), a contradiction.
The only remaining possibility is g 1 (s) = I + . But since s < I − and I ∈ D 3 ∪ D 5 , this is impossible.
If g 1 (x 0 ) < I − , then let t 0 be a number that satisfies (2). We have that
(4) ∀t, I − < t ≤ I + , we have g 1 (t) = I + : Otherwise there exists t 0 , I − < t 0 ≤ I + such that g 1 (t 0 ) > I + . Choose s, I + < s < g 1 (t 0 ). We shall see where g 2 (s) can be:
PROOF OF PART 2. As the mean value exclusion condition is symmetric, by reversing the order of R + and exchanging I − and I + , the proof of part 1 yields a proof of part 2.
LEMMA A.11. Let I 1 , I 2 ∈ D such that I 1 = I 2 . Then I 1 ∩ I 2 = φ.
PROOF OF LEMMA A.11. Let us assume for the sake of contradiction that t ∈ I 1 ∩ I 2 = φ. Then if I 1 = (I − 1 , I + 1 ), I 2 = (I − 2 , I + 2 ) we have three cases:
(1) I 1 , I 2 both satisfy the "+" condition. Then: g 1 (t) = I + 1 and g 1 (t) = I + 2 g 2 (t) = I − 1 and g 2 (t) = I − 2 ⇒ I + 1 = I + 2 , I − 1 = I − 2 ⇒ I 1 = I 2 , a contradiction. (2) I 1 , I 2 both satisfy the "-" condition. Then: g 1 (t) = I − 1 and g 1 (t) = I − 2 g 2 (t) = I + 1 and g 2 (t) = I + 2 ⇒ I + 1 = I + 2 , I − 1 = I − 2 ⇒ I 1 = I 2 , a contradiction. (3) I 1 satisfies the "-" condition, and I 2 satisfies the "+" condition then: I 1 satisfies the "-" condition ⇒ g 1 (t) = I − 1 and g 2 (t) = I + 1 I 2 satisfies the "+" condition ⇒ g 1 (t) = I + 2 and g 2 (t)
Hence one of the segments is not defined as a legal segment, a contradiction.
The symmetric case to (3) has a symmetric proof.
LEMMA A.12. Let t be an end point of a segment I ∈ D. Then
(1) if t is an end point of I alone then ∀x ∈ I, g 1 (t) = g 1 (x), g 2 (t) = g 2 (x), (2) if t is an endpoint of two segments I, J ∈ D, then, (a) the two segments have opposite signs, and (b) ∀x ∈ I, g 1 (t) = g 1 (x) or ∀x ∈ J, g 1 (t) = g 1 (x) and ∀x ∈ I, g 2 (t) = g 2 (x) or ∀x ∈ J, g 2 (t) = g 2 (x).
PROOF OF LEMMA A.12. If t is an end point of I alone, then we shall split the proof into 4 parts.
(1) I satisfies the "+" condition and t = I − . Then by Lemma A.10 it follows that g 2 (I − ) = I − , we will show that g 1 (I − ) = I + :
Otherwise, we will find a number s, g 1 (I − ) < s < I + , and then by Lemma A.10 it follows that g 2 (s) = I − . This implies g 2 (s) = I − ≤ g 1 (I − ) < s, a contradiction. g 1 (I − ) / ∈[ 0, I − ): Otherwise (g 1 (I − ), I − ) ∈ D 2 and by Lemma A.7 it follows that there exists a segment I ∈ D such that (g 1 (I − ), I − ) ⊆ I . But by Lemma A.11 I ∩ I = φ. Hence I − is the right end point of I , a contradiction to the assumption of this case. g 1 (I − ) / ∈ (I + , ∞): Otherwise (I − , g 1 (I − )) ∈ D 1 and therefore ∃I ∈ D such that I (I − , g 1 (I − )) ⊆ I , a contradiction to Lemma A.11. The only remaining possibility is g 1 (I − ) = I + .
(2) I satisfies the "+" condition and t = I + . Then by Lemma A.10 it follows that g 1 (I + ) = I + , we will show that g 2 (I + ) = I − : g 2 (I + ) / ∈ (I − , I + ]: Otherwise, we will find a number s, I − < s < g 2 (I + ), and then by Lemma A.10 it follows that g 1 (s) = I + . This implies s < g 2 (I + ) ≤ I + = g 1 (s), a contradiction. g 2 (I + ) / ∈[ 0, I − ): Otherwise, the segment (g 2 (I + ), I + ) is not contained in I. We will show that there exists another J ∈ D such that (g 2 (I + ), I + ) ⊆ J. This will be a contradiction to Lemma A.11. To show the existence of such a segment we shall show that for s such that g 2 (I + ) < s < I − , g 1 (s) ≥ I + . This will imply by using Lemma A.7 that there exists a segment J ∈ D as desired. Let s satisfy g 2 (I + ) < s < I − . We will show that all other possibilities cannot be true:
Otherwise g 1 (s) ≤ g 2 (I + ) < s, a contradiction. g 1 (s) / ∈ (g 2 (I + ), I + ): Otherwise g 2 (I + ) < g 1 (s) < I + , a contradiction. g 2 (I + ) / ∈ (I + , ∞): Otherwise, we will show that there exists a second segment J ∈ D such that J = I but I + is a left end point of J. Let s ∈ (I + , g 2 (I + )). Then g 1 (s) / ∈[ 0, I − ]: Otherwise g 1 (s) ≤ I − = g 2 (I − ) < s, a contradiction. g 1 (s) / ∈ I: Otherwise, we can find a number d ∈ (g 1 (s), I + ) and then by Lemma A.10 g 2 (d) = I − < g 1 (s) < d, a contradiction. g 1 (s) / ∈ (I + , g 2 (I + )]: Otherwise I + < g 1 (s) ≤ g 2 (I + ), a contradiction. g 1 (s) / ∈ (g 2 (I + ), ∞): Otherwise s < g 2 (I + ) < g 1 (s), a contradiction. So, by Lemma A.7 there exists a segment J ∈ D such that (I + , g 2 (I + )) ⊆ J. By Lemma A.11 J I = φ, so I + is the left end point of J and I, a contradiction to the assumption of this case. The only remaining possibility is g 2 (I + ) = I − .
(3) I satisfies the "-" condition and t = I − : the proof is similar to (2). (4) I satisfies the "-" condition and t = I + : the proof is similar to (1).
If t is an end point of two segments, we split the proof into two parts.
(1) The two segments have opposite signs:
Assume for the sake of contradiction that t is an end point of two segments I 1 = (x, t), I 2 = (t, y) that both satisfy the "+" condition. Then, by Lemma A.10 and the fact that t is the left end point of I 2 , it follows that g 2 (t) = t. It also follows by Lemma A.10 that ∀x ∈ (x, t) g 1 (x ) = t. Hence x < t = g 2 (t) = g 1 (x ), a contradiction.
In the same way it can be shown that t can't be an end point of 2 segments that satisfy the "-" condition.
(2) Now we shall show that ∀x ∈ I 1 , g 1 (t) = g 1 (x) or ∀x ∈ I 2 , g 1 (t) = g 1 (x) and ∀x ∈ I 1 , g 2 (t) = g 2 (x) or ∀x ∈ I 2 , g 2 (t) = g 2 (x): Let us say that t is a common end point of I 1 = (x, t) that satisfies the "+" condition, and of I 2 = (t, y) that satisfies the "-" condition.
(The opposite case is handled in a similar way.) By Lemma A.10 and the fact that I 1 satisfies the "+" condition, it follows that g 1 (t) = t as for any x ∈ (x, t) .
So we need to show that g 2 (t) ∈ {x, y}:
We shall see where g 1 (s) can be:
Otherwise choose y , x < y < t. By Lemma A.10 it follows that g 2 (y ) = x and hence s < g 2 (y ) < t ≤ g 1 (s), a contradiction. g 2 (t) / ∈ (x, t]: Otherwise choose y , x < y < g 2 (t). By Lemma A.10 it follows that g 1 (y ) = t and hence y < g 2 (t) ≤ t = g 1 (y ), a contradiction. g 2 (t) / ∈ (t, y): Otherwise choose y , g 2 (t) < y < y. By Lemma A.10 it follows that g 1 (y ) = t and hence g 1 (y ) = t < g 2 (t) < y , a contradiction.
Otherwise choose y , t < y < y. By Lemma A.10 it follows that g 2 (y ) = y and hence g 1 (s) ≤ g 2 (y ) < s, a contradiction. g 1 (s) / ∈ (y, g 2 (t)]: Otherwise t < y < g 1 (s) ≤ g 2 (t), a contradiction.
We have shown that g 2 (t) ∈ {x, y}.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION A.4. Suppose that g 1 , g 2 , satisfy the mean value exclusion condition. Recall the definition of the set of segments D. Note that D satisfies the following. -By Lemma A.12 no two segments with a common end point have the same sign. Now we apply Lemmas A.9, A.10 and A.12 to conclude that (D, G) is (g 1 , g 2 )compatible.
A.1.2. Some Observations on Ex-Post Equilibria. We observe that in any ex-post equilibrium the most valued alternative for a player must have the highest reported valuation.
LEMMA A.13. Let n ≥ 1 and let b be an ex-post equilibrium for the class of VCG games over (N, A, V) . Then for all i and all (a ) , for all a = a, and consider the one-player game with player i. As b is an ex-post equilibrium for the class of games, by definition it is an equilibrium for any game played by a subset of the players and in particular the single-player game with player i. In this game, the chosen alternative must be optimal for i, and so it must be that i's valuation on it was the highest,
LEMMA A.14. Let b be an ex-post equilibrium for the class of VCG games over (N, A, V) . If a is chosen at the profile v, then for any i
PROOF. Assume the claim is wrong, and that for some (â) . Note that the left-hand side is i's utility, whereas the right-hand side is i's utility from reporting truthfully. Thus, contradicting the ex-post equilibrium assumption. 
Consider the following valuation function for some player j = i. v j (ā) = 0, for all a ∈ {a, a }, v j (a) = 3x and v j (a ) = 3x (a) . Assume that someâ ∈ {a, a } is chosen in the two-player VC game with i and j. Then player j's utility does not exceedx (recall that in a VC game the functions h i are identically zero). However, by bidding truthfully either a or a would have been chosen and j's utility would be at least 2x, leading to a contradiction. Therefore, either a or a are chosen.
If a is chosen then j's utility is 3x
. This is strictly less than 3x + b i (v i )(a), which is the utility j could have received by reporting truthfully on a and zero on all other alternatives. This contradicts the ex-post equilibrium assumption, and therefore it must be the case that a is chosen. In this case the utility of i is
Therefore the utility of i is strictly less than v i (a ) + b j (v j )(a ), which is what i could have received by reporting truthfully on a and zero on all other alternatives. Throughout the proofs we make use of the following valuation functions, which we refer to as single-minded valuations: for i, Z (a,s) i ∈ IR A + , which assigns a ∈ A the value s > 0 and zero otherwise. We denote g (a,a ) i
LEMMA A.16. Let n ≥ 2 and |A| ≥ 3. Let b be an ex-post equilibrium for the class of VCG games over (N, A, V) . Assume that for some i, j ∈ N and for any s ∈ R, Z Before we move to prove Lemma A.16 let us consider an example to help understand the intuition underlying the proof. Let g 1 , g 2 be as defined in the preceding and let v be the actual real valuation. The following illustration, taken from Rozen [2005] , depicts the family of parallelograms associated with the ex-post equilibrium of the mechanism.
To better understand the example we provide the following clarifying comments.
(1) If player 1's valuation of A is inside a parallelogram he will declare that his valuation of A is the upper corner of the parallelogram. (2) If player 2's valuation of A is inside a parallelogram he will declare that his valuation of A is the lower corner of the parallelogram. (3) If a player's valuation of A is at a point where two parallelograms meet, and the behaviors implied by the two parallelograms differ (as happens in the example for player 2 at s = 8 and for player 1 at s = 9), then any of these behaviors (lower or upper corner) is allowed, and the actual choice of behavior is not represented graphically here. (4) If a player's valuation of A is not in a parallelogram he will declare the truth on A. In Figure 1 , there are three parallel rays representing R + the middle ray represents v(a) = s, while the top and bottom ray represent g 1 and g 2 respectively.
For each v(a) = sεR + two lines are drawn one to g 1 (s) and the other to g 2 (s). In this example = {(4, 8)" + ", (8.9)" − ", (9, 12)" + ", (13.5, 14.5)" − "}. LEMMA A.18. Let n ≥ 3, |A| ≥ 3, and let b be an ex-post equilibrium for the class of VCG games over (N, A, 
mechanisms for the single-player game, there exists one that chooses the alternative a , in case of a tie between a and a . This contradicts the fact that, in an ex-post equilibrium, if player 1 is on his own then the maximizing alternative must always be chosen.
LEMMA A.20. Let a, a be any two alternatives and let (a,a ) = (x, y) in (a,a ) such that x < < y, again due to Lemma A.19 0 < x. As for this case's conditions it follows that for any segment J ∈ (a,a ) , J (0, x) = φ. So, for any δ ∈ (0, x), g (a,a ) 1
Case 2. For any segment J ∈ (a,a ) , j (0, ) = φ. Then for any δ ∈ (0, ), g (a,a ) 1 (δ) = g (a,a ) 2 (δ) = δ where 0 < δ < as required. Recall the definition of (a,a ) from Corollary A.17. PROPOSITION A.21. Let (b 1 , b 2 ) be an ex-post equilibrium in the VCG mechanisms. Let v 1 , v 2 ∈ V be two valuations for players 1 and 2, such that a is a maximizing alternative for v 1 and a is a maximizing alternative for v 2 . For any s that is not an end point of two segments in (a,a ) :
a is a maximizing alternative for v 1 and s is not an end point of two segments. Then we have the following.
(1) g (a,a ) 1 (s) = s.
-If s = g (a,a ) 1 (s) < b 1 (v 1 )(a) − b 1 (v 1 )(a ). Choose t, s = g (a,a ) 1 (s) < t < b 1 (v 1 )(a) − b 1 (v 1 )(a ). From the mean value exclusion condition it follows that s < g (a,a ) 2 (t). Consider the profile (b 1 (v 1 ), b 2 (Z (a ,t) 2 )). Let γ be a maximizing alternative of (b 1 (v 1 ), b 2 (Z (a ,t) 2 )). It follows by Lemma 2 that γ is also a maximizing alternative of (v 1 , b 2 (Z (a ,t) 2 )). Then γ = a , for otherwise g (a,a ) 2 (t) = b 2 (Z (a ,t) 2 ))(a ) − b 2 (Z (a ,t) 2 ))(γ ) < v 1 (γ ) − v 1 (a ) ≤ v 1 (a) − v 1 (a ) = s < g 2 (t), a contradiction. Again by Lemma 2, a should be a maximizing alternative of (b 1 (v 1 ), Z (a ,t) 2 ) as well. But b 1 (v 1 )(a) − b 1 (v 1 )(a ) > t = Z (a ,t) 2 (a ) − Z (a ,t) 2 (a), a contradiction.
-If b 1 (v 1 )(a) − b 1 (v 1 )(a ) < s = g (a,a ) 1 (s). Choose t, b 1 (v 1 )(a) − b 1 (v 1 )(a ) < t < s. From the mean value exclusion condition, it follows that g (a,a ) 2 (t) < s. It also follows by Lemma 2 that γ maximizes (v 1 , b 2 (Z (a ,t) 2 )). Therefore g (a,a ) 2 (t) = b 2 (Z (a ,t) 2 )(a ) − b 2 (Z (a ,t) 2 )(γ ) = b 2 (Z (a ,t) 2 )(a ) − b 2 (Z (a ,t) 2 )(a) < v 1 (γ ) − v 1 (a ) < v 1 (a) − v 1 (a ) = s. This contradicts the mean value exclusion condition.
(3) g (a,a ) 1 (s) > s. This case is handled in a similar way as the previous one.
For player 2 the proof is similar. PROOF. THE EASY DIRECTION OF THEOREM 3.2. We shall first show for an arbitrary set of functions f i : V → R + , i = 1, ..., n. The strategy tuple b i (v i )(a) = v i (a)+f i (v i ) forms an ex-post equilibrium for the class of VCG games over (N, A, (R + A ) n ). Consider a VCG mechanism d, a profile of valuations v = (v 1 , ..., v n ) ∈ V N , n arbitrary functions f i : V → R + and a buyer i. According to the strategies b i (v i )(a) = v i (a)+f i (v i ), the profile of announced valuations isv = (v 1 (a)+f 1 (v 1 ), ..., v n (a)+f n (v n )). Let
Let v be the profile of announced valuations consisting of an arbitrary announcement v i of buyer i and the fixed announcements v j (a) + f j (v j ) of buyers j ∈ N\{i}. Suppose that the alternative d(v ) is a . Then the utility of buyer i is
This is maximized when a maximizes v i (â) + j =i v j (â). But this is exactly what the mechanism maximizes when it chooses an alternative. So, by announcing v i the utility of i will be maximized. But if he announces v i + f i (v i ), where f i (v i ) does not change on the different alternatives, then the mechanism still maximizes i's utility. Note that these arguments fully mimic the standard arguments for proving that VCG mechanisms are incentive compatible. THE EASY DIRECTION OF THEOREM 3.3. Follows as a corollary from the preceding arguments and Proposition 3.1.
A.2.2. The Difficult Direction: n ≥ 2 and A > 2. The difficult direction of Theorem 3.3. In fact, to prove this direction we may assume, without loss of generality, that there are exactly n = 2 players (recall the definition of an ex-post equilibrium) and |A| ≥ 3, or alternatively that there are n = 3 players. 8 Assume for the sake of contradiction that the claim is wrong and that for some expost equilibrium b, there exists an agent i, without loss of generality i = 1 and a valuation function, v 1 , and two alternatives, a, a ∈ A such that b 1 (v 1 )(a) − v 1 (a) = b 1 (v 1 )(a ) − v 1 (a ). Without loss of generality we may choose a such that v 1 (a) = argmaxâ ∈A v 1 (â). There are two cases.
(1) b 1 (v 1 )(a) − v 1 (a) > b 1 (v 1 )(a ) − v 1 (a ). In this case, b 1 (v 1 )(a) − b 1 (v 1 )(a ) > v 1 (a) − v 1 (a ). By Proposition A.4, Proposition A.21 and Proposition A.22, the corresponding (a,a ) is not empty and there exists a segment I such that G(I) = +1 in (a,a ) x 1 − x 2 + h 3 + x 1 = h 3 − h 2 > g (a,a ) 1 (x 1 − δ) = b 1 (u 1 )(a) − b 1 (u 1 )(a ), which means that u 2 (a ) + b 1 (u 1 )(a ) > b 1 (u 1 )(a) + u 2 (a), thus reaching a contradiction.
(2) The proof for the case that b 1 (v 1 )(a) − v 1 (a) < b 1 (v 1 )(a ) − v 1 (a ) is similar to the previous case, and is therefore omitted.
The difficult direction of Theorem 3.2. Follows as a corollary from the proof of the difficult direction of Theorem 3.3 and Proposition 3.1.
